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ABSTRACT 
The global financial crisis is affecting local governments particularly 
strongly. The threat of insolvency looms large for many local governments, and 
therefore, it is unfortunately very timely to examine this issue. Can genuine 
bankruptcy occur, should it be allowed to occur, can it be prevented, and if it 
cannot be, how can it be managed well? In order to do so, the current essay sets 
out to investigate, on an empirical basis, how Germany has so far (i.e., before 
the crash) dealt with the issue of municipal insolvency. This pre-crisis approach 
also underlines the importance of the topic, because it shows that even in more 
or less financially solid times, municipalities were already exposed to high 
financial pressure. Now, the crisis has increased the number of municipalities 
facing a budget crisis. The results of the present investigation can assist in 
dealing with the consequences of the crisis. On account of its high and indeed 
paradigm-setting level of municipal autonomy, the possibility of drawing lessons 
from Germany should be particularly interesting. 
Key words: local government, local finances, financial crisis, municipal 
insolvency, prevention 
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1 Introduction 
The current global crisis and/or its aftermath are affecting local 
governments in most European – and other "Western" – countries through 
a specific impact, not least of which because of the general and "time-
honoured" tendency of national and regional governance bodies to "hand 
down" financial obligations to the municipal level (Schwarting, 2008, p. 
268; Faber, 2005, p. 945). This problem is exacerbated by two current 
phenomena: On the one hand, the increase of the importance of the 
local life-world for citizens in a globalised and, where applicable, 
European environment (see Stern, 1996, esp. 43; also Isin, 2002 and 
Drechsler, 1999), which makes more and not less financial resources 
necessary, and, on the other hand, the recent ideological tendency in 
public administration (PA), associated with the concept of the New Public 
Management (NPM), to dismantle local autonomy in the name of 
efficiency and – simply assumed – economies of scale, in other words a 
bias in favour of larger and more centralised units and against anything 
local and municipal (e.g., Seitz, 2008). 
Although the latter perspective has more or less vanished on the 
academic and scholarly level, at least in Europe, with the rise of the 
concept of the Neo-Weberian State (NWS) as the post-NPM paradigm 
(see Pollitt et al., 2009), it is still alive and well in policy and particularly 
on the municipal level (Cf. Reichwein, 2007). It is true that NWS is 
arguably the logical PA paradigm for getting out of the crisis. In its 
rhetoric and general assumption, NPM is very much "pre-crash" and is 
indeed part of the way of thinking that has led to, or at least significantly 
contributed to, the crash coming about as harshly as it did (see Drechsler, 
2009c). One reaction by financially troubled countries has been to force 
savings, cuts and such NPM measures that "reduce the state" (see Peters et 
al., 2010) – not without causing particularly harsh effects at the local 
level. 
All of this makes the issue of local governments becoming insolvent a 
particularly interesting topic. Can this occur, should it be allowed to 
occur, can it be prevented, and if it cannot be, how can it be managed 
well? It seems that this is an issue not least of which for Central and 
Eastern Europe, where Local Self-Government is arguably under particular 
duress and thus on the defence due to the crisis and partially even before 
it. To approach this question, it is especially interesting to look at the 
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Federal Republic of Germany for a variety of reasons. Although several 
federal investment programmes (see Zukunftsinvestitionsgesetz, 2009) 
seem to have had a positive effect on many municipalities in the sense 
that the crisis has not hit them as hard as had been feared (OECD, 
2010), Germany has been particularly affected by the crisis (BMF, 2009), 
and there are and will be particularly detrimental effects for the local 
governments (Käppner 2009; see most recently Oberhessische Presse, 
2010). 
On the one hand, Germany is generally a country with a classically 
very strong local sector and, certainly in its self-understanding, is the 
cradle of municipal autonomy (and for municipal autonomy the cradle of 
democracy; see Drechsler, 2001). Its founding father and "patron saint", 
Karl vom Stein, recently celebrated his 250th birthday (see Drechsler, 
2007; Duchhardt, 2007, esp. 199–203; Ritter, 1981, esp. 196–199) and 
the first establishment act of Municipal Autonomy, the Preußische 
Städteordnung, celebrated its bicentennial (see Drechsler, 2008; 
Ordnung für sämmtliche Städte, 1957). This idea also had a significant 
impact on the restoration of Local Self-Government in Central and Eastern 
Europe after 1989 (Drechsler 2008, p. 137). 
On the other hand, especially at the local level, NPM – under the 
name "New Steering Model" – has hit especially hard – often through 
good intentions – and been promoted with verve by the "think-tank" of the 
municipalities themselves (the "KGSt"), the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
a very powerful foundation (Bertelsmann) and many academics and civil 
servants. This created an atmosphere in which to diverge from the 
assumptions of NPM, even to demand calculations, costs or justifications, 
was regarded as heresy (Drechsler, 2009a, pp. 315–319). Regarding 
Municipal Autonomy, NPM also united with the "social engineering" 
approach of the 1970s and its cult of the doable (on the history of the 
approach, Etzemüller, 2009), and Germany had become one of the 
countries where it was just assumed that larger municipal units would lead 
to increased efficiency. The otherwise very important "Rastede" decision of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, for instance, proclaimed this very view en 
passant,1 never mind that we have no reason whatsoever to believe that 
                                              
1 BverfGE 79, 127; »In many respects, however, a centralistically organised administration 
could work more rationally and cheaply,« 153. Regarding the positive aspects of Rastede, 
see Schmidt-Aßmann, 1991. 
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increased municipal unit size automatically increases efficiency, but we do 
know that there is a tendency for it to weaken democracy and citizen 
identification with the community (Drechsler, 1999). 
In this context, the current essay sets out to investigate, on an 
empirical basis, how Germany has so far (i.e. before the crash) dealt with 
the issue of municipal insolvency. Specific approaches to resolve the 
current financial crisis and to prevent future local financial crises are at the 
centre of these observations. To look at those pre-crash tools may be of 
particular interest, because they were formulated and tried without the 
hastiness and confusion that might have accompanied any crisis-based 
attempts at solutions. Also, there is enough empirical material and 
analysis for them to already render such an investigation possible. 
As the purpose of this essay is to familiarise the non-expert regarding 
Germany, we have utilised German-language literature (which completely 
dominates this specific discourse anyway, of course) as much as possible 
to show how the issue is discussed nationally. The empirical parts, and to 
a large extent also the argumentation of this essay, are based on Duve, 
2008a, Duve, 2008b and Duve, 2009b, which were also part of Duve, 
2009a. All were in German. 
2 Extreme indebtedness as a danger to local 
autonomy 
The debt situation of the municipalities had already deteriorated 
significantly in the years before the global financial and economic crisis. 
This development was expressed in the fact that more and more 
municipalities could not balance their budget (Henneke, 2008a, p. 232). 
The rapid increase in Kassenverstärkungskredite (cash advances) confirms 
this trend impressively. 
The financial crisis worsened, often greatly, the budget-deficit 
situation of many municipalities (Bock, Hein and Weinberger, 2010). Due 
to a substantial decrease of income deriving from the Gewerbesteuer 
(trade or business tax) – their main source of income – and a sharp 
increase of social expenditures, the municipalities were already carrying a 
deficit of €7.1 billion in 2009 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010a). In 
addition to that, a number of German municipalities had to carry risks 
caused by Cross-Border-Leasing contracts. The financial problems and 
failures of many American banks and insurances (Kirbach, 2009) now 
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threaten the municipalities involved. Until today, the feared problems were 
held off, however, or at least did not emerge. 
Generally, municipal life is suffering from a high indebtedness, and in 
its present form, it is not sustainable if too high a percentage of the 
revenues has to be spent on paying back loans. The municipalities then 
often lack money for necessary investments, which consequently has 
detrimental effects on public infrastructure. Also, and maybe even 
especially so, the decline of voluntary tasks (i.e., measures which local 
governments may take but are not required by law), which many 
municipalities can no longer afford, harm the social and cultural life 
within the municipalities (Henneke, 2008a, p. 232; Welt, 2010, p. 10), 
although it is those things that make life in a specific community especially 
attractive and satisfying. 
This is particularly worrisome if one considers the key role 
municipalities play within the German state system, which becomes 
evident when one examines their functions and tasks. Municipalities 
implement approximately 80 per cent of all state laws and thus form the 
basis of the state administration (Knemeyer, 1997, p. 204). Via their 
investments (e.g., in cultural and social institutions as well as in the 
municipal infrastructure), they also contribute significantly to the prosperity 
of the population (Raske, 1971, pp. 172–173). Connected to this is the 
importance of local governments as carriers of general services for the 
public (Forsthoff, 1958). 
In Germany, it is generally the Länder (roughly, the states) that deal 
with the local governments, not the federal level authorities (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Arrangement of the administrative levels in Germany 
1st State Level 1 Federation 
2nd State Level 16 Länder (of it 3 City states) 
1st Local Level 323 Counties and 112 independent Cities 
2nd Local Level 12,188 dependent Municipalities (within Counties) 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 14, Reihe 3.3, 2007. 
The constitutional tie of the municipalities to the Länder is connected 
with a right of supervision by the latter (Wagener and Blümel, 1997, 
p. 114). Federal supervision over the municipalities does not exist in 
Germany (Gern, 2003, p. 520). This essay therefore deals with 
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the question of how the Länder attempt to deal with their responsibility for 
the indebtedness of the municipalities. The focus is in particular on the 
way the supervising authorities act in handling local budgetary hardships. 
A look at the indebtedness of the German state shows that in relation 
to the total sum, €1.7 trillion in 2009, the indebtedness of the 
municipalities amounts only to about 7 per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2010b). 
This small percentage carried by the local level, however, is no 
reason for carelessness, since it is not distributed equally among all 
municipalities. A closer look at local indebtedness shows considerable 
regional and structural variations (Junkernheinrich and Micosatt, 2008, p. 
14). The very high indebtedness is challenging to some Länder and 
especially to their supervisory authorities, which also bears on their 
capacity to intervene. Thus, the interventions covered by the supervisory 
authority varies strongly according to region and financial situation. 
The task of the supervisory authority is limited to monitoring the 
legality of the actions of the local administrations (see Art. 49 §3 2nd stc of 
the Constitution of Rhineland-Palatinate). For the enforcement of this 
mission, there are various measures available. Repressive measures are 
specified comprehensively in the Gemeindeordnungen (laws covering 
affairs of local government) of the Länder and are implemented only 
according to the principle of appropriateness. They consist of the 
following actions: 
• Right to Instruct 
• Right to Object and to Abolish (if there are preceding violations 
of law) 
• Right to Command (when legal obligations are not fulfilled) 
• Ersatzvornahme (exercising an action by the supervisory authority 
at the expense and in the name of the municipality) 
• Appointment of a commissioner (if the measures listed above are 
insufficient) 
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• Dissolution of the local council 2  and pre-term ending of the 
Mayor’s mandate3 (only possible in some Länder) 
The options for interventions of the supervisory authority of the Länder 
into matters of local autonomy are thus clearly defined. Beyond these 
measures, no further legal actions exist. 
3 Autonomous action and national specifications – 
which scope do German municipalities have? 
According to Art. 28 § 2 GG ("Grundgesetz"), the German Constitu-
tion guarantees to the municipalities the right to regulate all affairs of the 
local community by themselves. However, there are a substantial number 
of national specifications that limit the extent of autonomy and 
responsibility. Next to voluntary self-administration tasks, which were 
mentioned supra, there are also many duties assigned by the Länder. The 
municipal execution of all tasks stands under law proviso (Falk, 2006, p. 
117). 
Mainly because of the duty to execute state tasks, over the years, the 
interconnectedness between the municipal level and that of the Länder 
has increased substantially (Burgi, 2006, p. 88). While voluntary tasks are 
at the core of the self-government guarantee, in terms of percentage, the 
assigned government tasks prevail. In the majority of municipalities, 
voluntary tasks represent less than 10 per cent of expenditures 
(Schwarting, 2005, p. 142). However, when transferring state duties to the 
local level, appropriate funding by the Länder plays a central role. In the 
past, the Länder did not often act accordingly, and in fact, this is one of 
the reasons for the current financial crisis of many municipalities 
(Schwarting, 2008, p. 268; Albers, 2005, p. 61; Faber, 2005, p. 945; 
Frischmuth, 2008, p. 136). How to determine, on an empirical basis, the 
financial volume required for a municipality remains an unsolved problem 
(Junkernheinrich, 2007, p. 173). 
In order for the municipalities to be in a position to carry out their 
tasks appropriately – also to ensure equal life conditions as stipulated by 
Art. 72 § 2 GG – they receive money from the Länder within the scope of 
                                              
2 § 141a GemO Hessen; § 84 Kommunalverfassung Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; § 125 
GemO Nordrhein-Westfalen; § 125 GemO Rheinland-Pfalz.; § 122 Abs. 2 GemO 
Thüringen. 
3 § 118 GemO Sachsen. 
Thomas Duve, Wolfgang Drechsler 
Insolvent Local Government: 
German Approaches to Prevention 
14 Uprava, letnik IX, 2/2011 
the municipal revenue-sharing depending on funding requirements. In 
other words, richer municipalities get less money than poorer ones. The 
subsidiary character of these allocations has been gone for a long time; in 
many places, they are now a key source of revenue. In the East German 
Länder, the share of these allocations relative to the municipalities’ total 
receipts is roughly 50 per cent (Lenk and Rudolph, 2005, p. 57). Thus, 
municipalities are very dependent on the Länder, especially as the amount 
of the transfers are not fixed but depend on the economic situation of the 
respective Länder. Another problem arises as a result of the still increasing 
financial losses of many Länder, which also has an impact on the funding 
of the municipalities (Henneke, 2008b, p. 858). Particularly in the current 
crisis that also burdened the budgets of the Länder, cuts in state 
allocations have catastrophic effects on the budget situation and thus on 
the local autonomy of the municipalities (Bock, Hein & Weinberger 
2010). 
Mainly due to the global financial crisis, the German federal 
government created a municipal finance commission in 2010 (BMF, 
2010). Its task is to sort out municipal finance, and its tasks include 
finding a substitute for the commercial tax as a source of revenue. It 
remains to be seen how successful the work of the commission will be, 
especially as it will not tackle the key topic of restructuring the spending 
structures. Without a doubt, the essential first step towards a sustainable 
prevention of municipal insolvency in Germany would be the appropriate 
matching of municipal spending with the genuine revenue situation. 
4 Insolvency proceedings as a sword of Damocles for 
municipalities? 
The financial crisis brought the topic of insolvency to the agenda once 
again, but mainly related to an international insolvency law for countries 
(IWD, 2010, p. 6). The current legal situation in Germany does not 
include the concept of municipal bankruptcy. § 12 (1), no. 2, of the 
"Insolvenzordnung" (InsO) declares that bankruptcy proceedings against 
the assets of legal entities under public law are inadmissible unless the law 
of the Länder states otherwise. None of the German Länder have stated 
so (Faber, 2005, p. 938). 
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The German municipalities, like the German state as a whole, are 
considered to be credit-worthy without restrictions. 4  Consequently, 
municipalities receive credits from banks even when they have already 
reached a very high level of indebtedness. This, in turn, means that 
municipalities in Germany can never go bankrupt in the sense of 
bankruptcy as the state in which one cannot receive credit anymore to 
honour one’s obligations. For the Länder, this has the consequence that 
they never have to stand in for the municipalities’ commitments 
(Engelsing, 1999). 
4.1 Arguments for municipal insolvency proceedings 
Thus, to at least consider municipal insolvency proceedings seems 
logical, especially in the current context. The advantage of such 
proceedings, it has been argued, would be that with the introduction of 
insolvency proceedings, limits to local indebtedness would no longer be 
achieved only via legal regulations but also via market mechanisms 
(incentive effect) (Blankart, Fasten & Klaiber, 2006, p. 571) – although 
this of course assumes the possibility of market effects in the public 
sphere. More importantly, it is intended to give municipalities with 
extremely high debt the chance to start over by using an insolvency 
proceeding, in other words by declaring bankruptcy (redevelopment effect) 
(Paulus, 2003, p. 869). 
As a direct consequence of the possibility of a municipality’s 
insolvency proceedings, the banks would have to take into account the 
risk of losing a certain amount of the granted credits, which means that 
the existing zero-risk for credits could not be maintained – in fact, this is 
the idea. The potential risk would then be determined by the banks on the 
basis of ratings (Interview Bergmann, 2008). Depending on the solvency 
of the municipality, the credit costs could thus increase and the credit 
conditions for the municipality could worsen. 
According to the expectations of the supporters of the possibility of 
municipal insolvency, politicians would endeavour in the future to reduce 
indebtedness or at least to keep it low in order to avoid high credit costs 
or even insolvency proceedings. Thus, cases of insolvency would not 
actually be expected to occur, but the possibility of it would serve as 
                                              
4 In accordance with the "Solvabilitätsverordnung", local credits have a risk weighting after 
the credit risk standard of 0 percent. 
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a means of deterrence (Meyer, 2007). Creditors and debtors alike would 
therefore do everything to avert bankruptcy (Blankart, 2007). 
If a municipality, however, is already trapped in the vicious circle of 
inescapable debt, a modified insolvency procedure would work as an 
instrument for reorganisation (Paulus, 2003, p. 872), providing the 
municipality with the possibility of a fresh start. Moreover, with the help of 
this procedure, the possibility of reducing personnel faster is seen as an 
additional benefit aiding in preventing future burdens (Borchert, 2004, p. 
3; Frielinghaus, 2008, p. 997). 
4.2 Arguments against municipal insolvency proceedings 
The described expectations certainly seem to be attractive at first 
sight. At second glance, however, several problems become apparent. 
To achieve the described incentive effect with the help of variable 
credit conditions, the Länder would in principle have to rule out rescuing 
municipalities from financial difficulties (a so-called bailout). Otherwise, 
the banks would not be able to realistically estimate the credit risks. The 
question, however, is how to distinguish between state grants and a 
bailout? The grants of the Länder to many municipalities are not 
negligible. Rather, as has already been mentioned, this allocation is an 
essential part of the revenues. Without this money, a recovery of the 
budgetary situation would be impossible for many municipalities. It cannot 
be denied that these allocations already represent a sort of bailout 
(Schwarting, 2005, p. 145). 
Furthermore, if municipalities are to be sanctioned via insolvency, 
they must be able to influence their financial situation. The municipalities 
have this kind of freedom only to a very limited extent, since they have 
been assigned many tasks and are thus tied to legal requirements to a 
large extent. Unlike private companies, which can, for example, limit their 
production, order short-time work, reduce personnel quickly or even 
relocate their headquarters’ location, municipalities do not have these 
possibilities at their disposal. 
On the revenue side, also, the range of possible actions is rather 
limited. In particular, financially weak municipalities are to a very large 
extent dependent on regular grants by the Länder. These financially weak 
municipalities with few options for action are most likely to be affected by 
insolvency (Interview Wohltmann, 2008). Local authorities can hardly 
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change this situation, because municipal legislation and municipal 
financial resources are an area of competence of the Länder (Werner-
Jensen, 2006, p. 32) and thus out of the control of the municipalities 
(Klein, 2005, p. 72). 
Were an insolvency case in fact to occur, then the central question 
would emerge regarding which municipal assets could be ordered to be 
sold by the liquidator, since those assets are directly linked either to 
voluntary tasks or to state-tranferred duties – and a clear distinction 
between those is often difficult to make (Albers, 2006, p. 756). If the 
insolvency proceedings restricted voluntary tasks, this could eliminate the 
field of self-responsible performance of the municipalities and thus 
liquidate local self-government in the affected municipalities (Faber, 
2005, p. 945). 
Another problem is that in most cases, an intensive budget-
consolidation process would already have taken place, in the course of 
which the sale of most of the possible assets would have been taken into 
consideration. Thus, insolvency would not come at a time of large variety 
of possible actions. On the contrary, the debt level would be extremely 
high, and most of the assets would have been sold already. There would 
not be much left for the insolvency proceeding. In addition, in recent 
years, municipalities have outsourced their assets very much and, through 
that, partly also their debts. The proportion of this "outsourced debt" in, for 
example, limited-liability companies amounted to 53.1 per cent at the end 
of 2007 (Junkernheinrich and Micosatt, 2008, p. 16). 
It is interesting to note that in the German discourse, the discussion of 
the possibility of municipal insolvency proceedings is exclusively an 
academic one (i.e., it has taken place only among scholars and within 
academic articles). The responsible Ministries of the Interior of the Länder 
and the municipal associations decline to even discuss this option. As 
reasons, the above-mentioned arguments are usually cited, being 
perceived to much outweigh any advantages. 5  Whether they are the 
reason or just the excuse is another matter of course. We may assume an 
amalgam of both. It is probably fair to say that the possibility of municipal 
bankruptcy is so alien to the German legal-administrative system and 
culture that it is indeed not an option, not even after the changes 
                                              
5 Interviews with Wohltmann; Dedy; Frischmuth; Mnich; Kirchmer; Dornig; Puhr; Stöfen; 
Penzenstadler-Hennig; Würger, Hoerenz; Wagenführer. 
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in thinking that NPM has actually brought about. Quite apart from 
whether such an instrument would actually be a good idea – and as, 
indeed, context-wise, it probably is not, already for this reason – it is 
certainly an unrealistic one. If all policy-actor sides involved (i.e., 
specifically the Länder and municipalities and their associations) agree 
that it would be a bad idea and if there is insufficient pressure to push 
them (which surely is the case; there are no prominent champions of it in 
either the media or politics and lobbying, and the topic is not exactly one 
to excite the general public on its own), then realistically, the idea is 
doomed. 
The general need for problem-solving nevertheless remains. Thus, the 
question presents itself of how a quasi-insolvent municipality can be 
reorganised without local insolvency proceedings on the one hand and 
how the way into the debt trap can generally be avoided on the other. 
5 The state takes over local administration: the 
implementation of a state-appointed commissioner 
using the example of the city of Bad Münster 
am Stein-Ebernburg 
If budgetary deficits cannot be fixed by comparatively mild actions 
within the realm of municipal control, or if measures of this sort are not 
deemed useful, by law, the respective Länder can appoint a 
commissioner. Such appointments are in fact only made very rarely. This 
does not mean, however, that cases of budgetary hardship are also that 
rare – to the contrary! Frequently, however, the budgetary problems are 
so extensive that the use of state commissioners is prevented either by the 
Länder themselves – if they do not regard it as an appropriate measure to 
solve the financial problems of the respective municipalities – or by 
political obstacles (party affiliations for instance). 
As a matter of fact, however, the only concrete case in which a state 
commissioner was appointed is that of the city of Bad Münster am Stein-
Ebernburg (BME).6 While this is of course as narrow an empirical basis as 
there possibly can be, here we do have a real-life, practical example 
                                              
6 The city of Bad Münster am Stein-Ebernburg (3,792 inhabitants) in Rhineland-Palatinate 
is situated to the south-west of Mainz in the administrative district of Bad Kreuznach and is 
one of ten municipalities that make up a larger consociation of municipalities, also named 
Bad Münster am Stein-Ebernburg. For more information on the city, see www.vg-bme.de/ 
(Accessed on 15 September 2010). 
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of this institution and looking at it more closely can reveal several 
problems that may have an impact on its potential success (see Duve, 
2008b). 
The main reason for BME’s deficit was its health-spa business, which 
was run by the town itself. This business caused immense losses over a 
long period, which had to be covered by the town. The situation 
deteriorated more and more since the late 1980s, when the number of 
customers decreased significantly, and this trend persisted throughout the 
1990s, not least of which because of an increase in competition from 
other spa resorts and as a result of federal health-care reforms (Interview 
Schoon, 2007). 
Already in the 1980s, the supervisory authority realised that trouble 
was ahead for BME’s financial development. Ever since, the council tried 
to advance the consolidation process by means of the measures at its 
disposal (Interview Reimann, 2008). However, when the council 
demanded in the late 1990s that the spa business be privatised or closed 
down, the city government did not follow suit. 
Consequently, the supervisory authority appointed a state 
commissioner from 17 January 2000 to 31 August 2003, who took over 
all competencies of the municipal council and also some of the mayor’s. 
Thus, the municipality was "administered from outside" for 3.5 years. 
Among the state commissioner’s tasks were not only closing down the 
spa business but also the management of the results thereof, the 
establishment of a stringent policy of savings and an overall improvement 
of the budgetary situation (Interview Bartos, 2007). 
The privatisation of the spa business, the savings policy and the 
realisation of revenue potentials, as demanded by the supervisory 
authority and implemented by the state commissioner, did not suffice to 
achieve a sustainable consolidation of the town’s budget. The town’s lack 
of power to act, as determined by the supervisory authority before the 
state commissioner was appointed, could not be eliminated. 
The employment of the state commissioner also underlined further 
problems. Processes of budget consolidations – especially in 
municipalities that are deeply in debt – are usually not short-term issues, 
and the implemetation of far-reaching projects takes several years. As 
state commissioners can hardly replace municipal bodies for years on end 
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but are better-suited for temporary interventions, they can only have a 
limited effect on processes of budget consolidation. Their potential lies in 
that they do not shy away from unpopular measures that local policy-
makers do not dare to implement. 
The commissioner’s job is particularly difficult if at the time of his or 
her appointment, the municipal debt is already so high that even "hard" 
measures of consolidation could not bring about a sustainable 
improvement of the financial situation. Certainly, even minute 
improvements are preferable to no improvements at all; still, it seems 
almost impossible to balance the budget by mere means of a 
commissioner. 
In this context, it should be noted that financial crises frequently 
develop in the form of "creeping catastrophes" (Böhret, 1993, p. 35). In 
some cases, the debt builds up very slowly. The scope of action is reduced 
only stealthily, which limits the pressure on political actors to act and also 
makes it hard or even impossible for them to estimate when the financial 
situation might capsise. 
All this leads to the following hypothesis: As there are several legal 
and political obstacles to the appointment of a state commissioner, in 
combination with a number of other measures that precede it, and as it is 
hard to detect the "right" moment for his or her appointment, it may be 
that state commissioners are appointed systemically "too late". Thus, there 
are certain systemic limits to a state commissioner’s effectiveness. It can 
therefore be assumed that in future cases, they will continue to play only a 
limited role in the genuine restoration of well-ordered budget 
management (Duve, 2008b). 
6 Preventive approaches to avoid budgetary 
hardships 
The problems of "repressive" measures like commissioners make plain 
the limited suitability of these instruments to cope with serious budgetary 
hardships. To prevent these to begin with, which seems to be the best 
solution than if they emerge accidentally rather than in a calculated way 
(which of course may also be the case), measures would be necessary that 
could strengthen the municipalities’ and the Länder’s realisation of and 
responsibility for problems afoot. 
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6.1 Systematic early diagnosis of municipal budgetary 
developments 
The main way of doing so is "early diagnosis". This is an instrument to 
make it possible to recognise symptoms of a looming crisis in time, to 
interpret them correctly and to react with appropriate measures 
(Uhlenbruck, 1998, p. 21). The municipality’s situation becomes 
problematic especially if the indebtedness has gained so much 
momentum that it cannot be stopped within the municipality’s realm of 
power. It is not all too easy for politicians to authoritatively identify that 
point, particularly as the situation of the economy – and also of the 
budget – can change very fast; a fact that can be witnessed at the 
moment. 
There are only few Länder right now that pursue such a systematic 
prevention based on key figures, which has led to first – mostly positive – 
experiences. Saxony is a maverick in this, as a key-figure-based system 
was established there as early as 2003, providing the Ministry of the 
Interior with information on the state of municipal budgets, including 
municipal special-purpose associations and housing corporations 
(Interview Dornig, 2008). This practice has also been adopted by 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (Junker, 2007, p. 396); there are by 
now also similar systems in North Rhine-Westphalia and Thuringia 
(Interview Mnich, Hoffmann, 2008). 
Both in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and in Saxony, the Ministry 
of the Interior’s (the highest supervisory authority) sense of missing certain 
developments in the budgets of municipalities that belong to their 
administrative districts was an important reason for the establishment of 
these instruments. The supervisory authority was determined to beat the 
press to information about the budgetary problems of affected 
municipalities (Interview Dornig, 2008). This allows for the inference that it 
was not rare for the communication between various levels of municipal 
control to have been limited before, resulting in too late detections of 
budgetary imbalances. 
Ever since the early diagnostic system was introduced, the budgetary 
situation of many municipalities has improved significantly in Saxony 
(Graph 1), reopening their scope of action. The decisive question is which 
concrete measures led to this, for the early diagnostic system as such does 
not yet change anything about the municipalities’ financial situations. 
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Graph 1: Development of the budgetary situation of municipalities in Saxony’s 
early diagnostic system 
 
Source: Saxony Ministry of the Interior 
Budgetary improvements were first and foremost reached by means of 
more intensive communication among the controlling levels (Interview 
Dornig, 2008). As regular budget discussions were implemented, 
attended by representatives of all levels of legal supervision, problematic 
cases could not only be identified but a modus operandi could also be 
determined, and concrete tasks could be assigned; thus, a more effective 
and more sustainable consolidation could be achieved. What apparently 
had been missing before was the control of lower levels of supervision by 
the top supervising body. 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania published the results of the key-
figure system on the website of the Ministry of the Interior, a step that 
significantly increased the system’s transparency. Each municipalitiy can 
follow where it is classified within the "Rubikon" (as the system is called)7 
(Figure 1); furthermore, a number of key figures can be scrutinised that 
form the basis for the evaluation. 
                                              
7 Rubikon stands for "Rechnerunterstütztes Haushaltsbewertungs- und Informationssystem 
der Kommunen" [Computer-supported system of evaluation and notification of municipal 
budgets]. It also plays on the Classic allusion to the river that to cross it signifies a non-
reversible decision. 
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Figure 1: Classification of municipalities and cities in the Rubikon in 2008
 Independent cities    Secure performability   
 Endangered permanent performability   
Source: http://www.im.mv-regierung.de/rubikon/kreisauswertung/index2007.html 
(Accessed on 15 September 2010)
This transparency resulted in an increasing level of public discussion 
regarding the financial situation of particular municipalities. This, in turn, 
also increased the pressure to act and/or succeed both on the municipal 
and Länder levels. According to the Ministry of the Interior, reactions have 
been consistently positive. The k
question in public discussion (Interview Hoerenz, 2008).
6.2 Advisers and mentors as substitutes for commissioners
The second less invasive option to prevent municipal insolvency is a 
modified version of the commissioner, w
brings with it a set of serious problems. For this reason, the supervisory 
authority in North Rhine-Westphalia opted in some cases to introduce a 
measure that interferes less with self
of external advisers, a position that so far has been tried in Waltrop 
(2006–2008), Marl (2007–
external advisers, also referred to as "mentors" or "advisory savings 
                                             
8  Regarding the specific cases, see www.sparkommissar
September 2010); more city information under: www.marl.de; www.hagen.de; 
www.waltrop.de (Accessed on 15 September 2010).
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commissioners" by the press, were granted a comprehensive right of 
information. They did not, however, have the power to command; their 
task was to advise the municipalities regarding their budget consolidation, 
providing warnings and recommendations. The intention on the part of 
the supervisory authority is to give the municipalities the chance »to solve 
the budgetary problems to a substantial extent on their own.« 9  The 
municipalities’ readiness to cooperate is regarded here as a necessary 
condition for the appointment of such an adviser. If they are not willing to 
do so, the municipal electorate may consider appointing a state 
commissioner 10 to implement the measures that are required from the 
Länder’s perspective. 
The municipality still has the possibility to centrally shape the 
consolidation process according to its preferences. The external advisers’ 
success is dependent on whether their warnings and recommendations 
are heeded and implemented. If the municipality fails to implement the 
measures, however, this might lead to a further delay of the whole process 
resulting in an ever graver crisis. As the readiness to cooperate is more or 
less forced upon the municipalities, this measure remains a balancing act 
between a paternalism of sorts and self-government. 
Much depends on the local context, the concrete sources of the debts, 
the size of the municipality and also the time when the adviser is 
appointed. If he or she finds that all possible measures for budget 
consolidation have already been exhausted without sustainable 
improvements, a state commissioner will not be able to ameliorate the 
financial situation either. In these cases, the adviser is not a stage before 
the state commissioner but the final stage. The situation is different if there 
are still exhaustable measures that are not implemented because the 
municipality does not properly follow the adviser’s recommendations. As 
external advisers do not have the power to direct, these cases call for the 
appointment of a state commissioner to implement the necessary 
measures. 
                                              
9 Justification of Münster’s district government regarding the appointment of an external 
adviser in the city of Waltrop according to § 124 GO NRW analog, from 11 January 
2006, 10. 
10 Reply by the Ministry of the Interior from 23 January 2007 to inquiry 1266 from 20 
December 2006, Landtag NRW, Drucksache 14/3617. 
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As regards the three specific cities, in Marl and Waltrop, approvable 
concepts for budget stability were drawn up, which had been deemed 
unthinkable by the supervisory authority before the appointment of the 
advisers. Time will tell if their appointment actually brings about the 
desired success in the end; this also depends on whether the cities remain 
consistent in pursuing a sustainable consolidation strategy. In February 
2009, a commission was created in Hagen, consisting of the city’s 
political leadership and the supervisory authority, to work out a concept 
for a balanced budget. The former external adviser’s recommendations 
served as a basis for this (Jakobs, 2009, p. 3). 
Still, the "adviser approach" can only be regarded as a preventive 
measure to a limited degree. His or her appointment is intended to avoid 
the involvement of a state commissioner, it is true. However, when an 
adviser is used in a commissioner’s stead, the crisis must have reached an 
advanced stage. Thus, systemically, advisers are appointed in order to rid 
the municipalities of crises that exist already. On account of the advanced 
debt dynamic, this can lead to problems similar to those connected to 
commissioners. 
7 Conclusion 
In an international context, German approaches to preventing 
municipal insolvency can be summed up as follows: 
1. Normatively, while preventing municipal insolvency is important, 
it may not serve as an excuse to abrogate local independence, 
and care must be taken to steer a middle course. 
2. This is especially the issue with state-appointed commissioners: If 
they are sent too early in the process, they violate local 
independence; if too late, they can no longer be effective. 
3. Thus, it is more sensible to focus on prevention, which is best 
done through the development of (mandatory) indicators that 
reflect imminent problems of the municipal budget. In cases 
where the reason for a coming insolvency is less ill will than lack 
of knowledge, this is indeed the most promising approach. 
Is any trans-national lesson-drawing from Germany possible and/or 
desirable in this case? Of course, the complexities of a possible transfer 
are as immense as is the general issue of policy-learning and the issue of 
best practices (Randma-Liiv, 2007). In addition, radical discontinuities in 
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the nature of the current crisis (though it was by no means impossible to 
foresee, including the effects on the public sector; see Drechsler, 2009b) 
make extrapolations from previous experiences difficult. Nonetheless, 
within the discussion of how to best prevent local insolvency, it should be 
interesting to note, especially during times of crisis, that the German 
experience shows that cooperation between the local level and the 
coordinating and supervising level "above" is much more promising and 
effective than any hard-handed intervention that may easily lead to the 
diminishing of municipal autonomy, which in the end would be 
detrimental to the interests of the state as such and of all of its citizens. 
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POVZETEK 
NEMŠKI PRISTOP K PREPREČEVANJU PLAČILNE 
NESPOSOBNOSTI LOKALNIH UPRAV 
Ključne besede:  lokalna samouprava, lokalne finance, finančna kriza, 
plačilna nesposobnost občine, preventiva 
Svetovna finančna kriza še zlasti močno napada lokalne uprave, kar 
še posebej velja za države Srednje in Vzhodne Evrope. Mnogim lokalnim 
upravam grozi velika nevarnost plačilne nesposobnosti, zato je žal prav 
zdaj zares pravi trenutek za to, da si pogledamo to vprašanje. Ali lahko 
nekdo sploh dejansko bankrotira? Ali bi morali dovoliti, da to tega pride? 
Ali je bankrot mogoče preprečiti, in če ga ni, kako ga ustrezno obvladati? 
S tem esejem želiva empirično raziskati, kako se je Nemčija do tega 
trenutka, torej pred zlomom, lotevala vprašanja plačilne nesposobnosti 
občin. Pristop, ki so mu sledili pred krizo, samo še podkrepi dejstvo, za 
kako pomembno tematiko gre, saj kaže, da so bile občine izpostavljene 
hudim finančnim pritiskom tudi že v bolj ali manj finančno trdnih 
obdobjih. Med krizo pa se je število občin, ki se soočajo s proračunsko 
krizo, še povečalo. Rezultati te raziskave bodo lahko v pomoč pri 
soočanju s posledicami krize. Zaradi visoke avtonomije občin, ki je 
dejansko postala paradigma, bi morala biti še zlasti za države Srednje in 
Vzhodne Evrope zanimiva možnost pridobivanja spoznanj iz Nemčije. 
Nemške zvezne države lahko v izogib proračunski krizi in torej hudo 
kritičnemu stanju življenja občine ravnajo na več načinov. S svojimi ukrepi 
lahko posegajo v lokalno samoupravo, zato je treba cilje in učinke 
ukrepov previdno uskladiti med seboj. 
Ta esej se osredotoča na troje: na obravnavo pojma "proračunska 
kriza", na njegovo uporabnost na ravni občin in stopnjo odgovornosti 
nemških zveznih držav za proračunsko krizo na občinski ravni, na 
empirično raziskavo rabe državnih nadzornikov v kontekstu konsolidacije 
proračuna, razpravo o rabi zunanjih svetovalcev pri teh procesih in 
razpravo o pristopu k bankrotu občin, pa tudi na pregled in oceno 
sedanjih preventivnih pristopov nemških zveznih držav. 
Nemške lekcije za plačilno nesposobne občine lahko okvirno 
povzamemo na naslednji način (vedno v nemškem kontekstu): 
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Pomembno je sicer preprečiti plačilno nesposobnost občin, vendar to 
ne sme biti izgovor za odpravo neodvisnosti lokalnih skupnosti. Treba je 
ubrati srednjo pot. 
To še zlasti velja za vprašanje nadzornikov, ki jih imenuje država: če 
jih pošlje prezgodaj, kršijo neodvisnost lokalnih skupnosti; če pa 
prepozno, ne morejo več učinkovito delati. 
Zato je pametneje usmeriti pozornost na preventivo, najbolje z 
oblikovanjem (zavezujočih) kazalnikov, v katerih se zrcalijo skorajšnje 
težave v občinskem proračunu. Ta pristop zagotovo največ obeta v 
primerih, ko je plačilna nesposobnost bolj posledica nezadostnega znanja 
kot pa zlonamernega ravnanja. 
 
